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Religion and Politics in Poland

The Catholic Church supported the resistance against the communist regime for 20 years. It contributed to the regime's collapse and defended Poland's national identity. Today, Poland's Catholic Church holds closely to conservative patterns and pursues its own political aims.

Polish Bishops

Every country represents a unique combination of history, culture, and societal characteristics that create specific outcomes in every field taken into account. As far as religion is concerned, the "uniqueness” of Poland lies, above all, in the very high level of declared religiosity, the identification of Poles with Roman Catholicism, and the religious homogeneity of its society.

Religiosity in Poland

The level of declared religiosity continues to be stable in the last few decades as eight out of ten Poles in representative research see themselves as religious or very religious. Some 95 per cent of adult Poles identify themselves with Catholicism and the stereotype "Poles are Catholics” continues to function. In spite of a rising interest in other religious traditions, especially in Buddhism among the younger population, according to empirical research the population of religious minorities does not exceed three per cent. In times of expanding pluralism and globalization , this – at least in general terms – quite steadfastly strong position of a single religious tradition comprises reason enough for investigation of the conditions of this phenomenon. This is all the more valid as considerations concerning contrasting tendencies of religious change, decline, and/or secularization are frequent and consistently popular.

Religions and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe before 1989

First visit to Poland of Pope John Paul II, Warsaw 1979. The slogan says: "Patriotic unity of the whole nation".

Despite this "exceptionality,” there are some recurrent features that justify discussing regions or help in comparing countries. With respect to this we can speak of some common characteristics in Central and Eastern Europe. The countries of this part of the continent are obviously and in many respects (the religious included) differentiated. Each has its own distinctive complex of historical, cultural, and national linkages. Yet, at the same time, all share the inevitably formative experience of communism, imposed atheization, and most recently – for almost two decades – democratization and all the rapid and multidirectional shifts of the political and social transformations.
Before the democratic changes initiated in Poland in 1989, the Church was a key element in the dualistic structure of society divided into "bad” communists, belonging to the communist party and its apparatus, and "good” Polish patriots, belonging to the Roman Catholic Church. Opposition to totalitarian rule was strongly supported by the Church which was, in turn, identified with defense of Polish national identity, freedom, human rights, and democracy. Taking into account the situation of Central and Eastern Europe under Soviet reign, the position of the Church in Poland was exceptionally strong in both its institutional and social dimensions. Social confidence in Church activity at the end of the 80s was higher than any other institution, hence the Party still considered the Church a decisive political actor on the shifting stage. All these factors had a crucial impact on the relationship between religion and politics, influencing the new arrangements which appeared in the postcommunist period.

From communism to democracy

The transformation to democracy and capitalism introduced multiple challenges to all social subsystems and the interconnections between them – once again including religion and politics. First of all, political freedom manifested itself partly through a new law regulating religious matters in a manner similar to that in the majority of democratic societies, i.e., guaranteeing safe and secure conditions for free expression of religious behavior and activity by individuals, communities, and religious organizations.
In Poland this had already taken place in May 1989 when statutes on religious freedom were passed. This fact created a space in which a new type of relationship was shaped between religion and politics at the institutional level, i.e., between the government and the churches (especially the largest one in the state). The other important factor in this relationship was a change in social expectations. Since under totalitarian rule a true political society was nonexistent, the Roman Catholic Church in Poland acted on behalf of and in lieu of it, representing the political interests of the oppressed populace. However, as a result of the transformation, political society in Poland could be and was formed; citizens acted out in ways typical of a democracy – consciously becoming members of political parties, voting. A consequence was that the social expectations concerning political activity of the Church were reduced. In fact, there was and continues to be a strong opposition to and even critique of "political involvement of the Church” – to use a category drawn from the empirical research. Yet this fundamental metamorphosis was not taken into account by Church representatives who did not cease practice of totalitarian era modus operandi. The bishops continued to speak on behalf of the nation, instructing the citizens on such issues as election choices.

The catholic church mired in old patterns?

In the opening years of the transformation process examples of such intervention by representatives of the Catholic Church were very evident and striking, and not only in content but also in form. Bishops spoke ex cathedra in paternalistic fashion, expecting to be treated as authority figures in all political matters and not accepting any criticism. A highly emblematic example for that period was Primate Cardinal Józef Glemp's speech in 1992: "We always want to serve the nation in any way we can, and no one can tell us how to do this. We understand the nation and we wish to serve it to the best of our abilities” (Gazeta Wyborcza, 28 June 1992). As Irena Borowik observed, even the nation could not explain to the ecclesiastic hierarchy how it wished to be understood and could not convince the Church that not only the entire, general, but even the Roman Catholic population itself was politically differentiated and supporting the "postcommunists” (politicians associated with the former communist party) .

On the other hand, the highest ranking representatives of the political subsystem stemming from the former opposition – that is, from circles closely cooperating with the Church in the past – also acted in accordance with old "partisan” ways. An apt illustration is the manner in which religious instruction was reintroduced [1] into public school curriculum. This was done almost surreptitiously: neither the Church, nor the government made an attempt to inform the public in advance and initiate discussion regarding this issue. Religious instruction was simply reinstated into public schools via an instruction from the Minister of Education, dated 3 August 1990 – shortly before the official beginning of the school year on 1 September.

Church, Society and the politic changes after 1989

Anti-abortion supporters in Warsaw, march 2007. The president of the Polish Bishop's Conference, Archbishop Jozef Michalik, and the League of Polish Families, a coalition partner of the former ruling party PiS, have called in 2006 for further restrictions in the already tight abortion laws.

This case demonstrates the means which the Catholic Church employs in order to achieve its own aims. Furthermore, it evidences the fact that these means receive support from the government. Both agendas – that of the Church as well as of the government – circumvented hearing the general vox populi or the voice of specific interest groups such as the non-Roman Catholic churches or NGOs. This example shows that, at this point, society was not acknowledged as a real and active partner in the decision-making process. In similar fashion Church representatives have not accepted public debate on the abortion law. More recently it has avoided broad and open discussion regarding members of the clergy who had, under communism, cooperated with the secret police, or – more troubling and timely – who have committed crimes of child or other forms of sexual abuse.

How should we interpret this behavior? Is this the local, Polish edition of a universal and widespread "Catholic policy”? Is this a still haunting legacy of the communist era when even superficial unity was an element of any strategy for survival? Should this be seen as the result of fear or its opposite – a sense of certainty and omnipotence? The same questions could also be posed today against the Roman Catholic clergy who use the rhetoric of fear and war when referring to the European Union.

The weakness inherent in this kind of instrumental treatment of a civic society has become visible in the lack of results. The "nation” and "society” have not acted in accordance with Roman Catholic Church advice, suggestions, and teachings. Left-oriented and democratic liberal parties receive stronger support than Catholic ones and Aleksander Kwaśniewski, the "postcommunist” candidate for president ideologically opposed by the Church, not only beat Lech Wałęsa but was reelected for a second term. That would seem to have been a very bitter lesson in democracy for the Church hierarchs. Moreover, it was accompanied by a growing pluralism and heterogeneity within the Church itself: a lack of subordination on the part of the ultra-conservative Radio Maryja (a very active commentator and actor in the field of politics) on the one hand, and demands for clarity and lustration (vetting of priests regarding collaboration with the previous system) on the other. The ferment surrounding the internal affairs of the Church proves the real diversity of its community. Increasingly obvious is that preservation of homogeneity and unanimity within such a big social body is not possible under democracy. Among other topics, the attitude of Church representatives towards European integration has drawn a picture which is more and more complex with passing time.

Did politics exploit religion?

The political actors of the post-1989 period have also used religion for their own aims. One of the requisite and recurring issues in the transformation years has been abortion . The Concordat (an agreement between a state and the Vatican) was yet another highly politicized issue in Poland, as was the wording (with its inclusion of Christian references to God) of the Preamble to the Constitution. Later on, by the end of the 90s and subsequently, the list of topics in which religion and politics significantly intersected was enriched by the problems of Polish integration with the European Union and of mention of religious values in the proposed EU constitution. The Polish voice in deliberations surrounding references to Christianity in the EU constitution clearly mirrors the equilibrium which had been achieved in the religion-politics relationship. Then President Alexander Kwaśniewski, while openly declaring himself an atheist, decidedly promoted allusion to Christianity. In fact, the example of the Polish Preamble was suggested as a good solution for the EU, as a compromise satisfying both believers and nonbelievers. The Preamble of the Constitution of Poland, ratified late (not until 1997), includes phrasing to which the politicians were referring:

"We, the Polish nation – all citizens of the Republic – both those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty, as well as those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal values as arising from other sources.”

Normalization of the relations between religion and politics

The years and now nearly two decades of transformation have revealed a need for the establishment of a new type of relationship between religion and politics as well as new forms of actions taken by the two primary actors in this relationship: the state and the church. Lessons of democracy by all the actors involved, including society, were and continue to be influenced by the black-and-white patterns of the past. The institutional representatives of the Roman Catholic Church seem to have learned quite a lot in the first decade of the transformation. This is most evident in a decrease in patently open "voting instructions.” Nevertheless a "normality” of relations between religion and politics – to use Patrick Michel's term – is not easy to achieve after the almost half century of Soviet totalitarianism. The deeply-rooted historic and symbolic contribution of Roman Catholicism to the national identity of Poles is still important in the transformation years; its impact is tangible in the mobilization of religious rhetoric in the field of politics. Nonetheless, it should not be ignored that, in general, the most recent years have opened a new chapter in scholarly investigation into the possible roles of religion in public life , as well as into religious vitality and the significance of religion in a secularizing world .

Further articles on the subject » Weltanschauung, » History, » Public Culture, » Religion, » Eastern Europe, » Poland
More from the press review on the subject » Weltanschauung, » History, » Public Culture, » Religion, » Eastern Europe, » Poland