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Post-war Georgia

The "Georgia crisis" did not mark the beginning of a new Cold War but it showed how fragile the relationship between Russia and the EU really is. So what lies in store for the Caucasus region and what role do other regional secession conflicts play here?

No other event in the Caucasus has triggered the kind of shock waves in international politics that the war between Russian and Georgian troops did in August 2008. Yet the five-day long war was by far the shortest of the six wars that have rocked this region since 1991. Nonetheless, not even the two wars in Chechnya in the northern Caucasus – the most violent conflict ever in the CIS region, with a much higher number of civilian deaths – attracted as much attention as this short-lived war with a death toll that remained within the three-digit zone.

A Russian soldier observes the Russian forces pulling back from the Georgian village of Karaleti, some 56 miles west of Tbilisi, October 2008. Photo: AP/Sergey Ponomare

This is because it was the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union that Russia engaged in a military conflict with a sovereign state – the very neighbouring state that has moved furthest in a European-Atlantic direction of all the states within the CIS region. It was this dimension of the conflict that mobilised all the geopolitical catchphrases: the proxy war, the new Cold War, the war over oil, a turning point in world politics, and so on. There were comparisons with 11 September 2001 and other turning points in international relations. Many of these comparisons were utter nonsense. Other catchwords – like "war over oil" or "proxy war", which alluded to a Russian-American conflict of interests in the Caucasus – may carry a certain element of truth but are nevertheless simplified formulas. Those who talk of a new Cold War would do well to recall the scale of the systematic military and ideological confrontation between the East and West blocs that this term denoted. The damage actually wrought on relations between Russia and the West by the Georgia crisis seems minor in comparison.

Russian reactions

According to Fedor Lukyanov, a prominent commentator on Russian foreign policy, the Georgian crisis has had the following consequences for Russia and its relations with the West: firstly, the differences between Russia's perception and the West's have become more obvious than in any previous conflict. The overwhelming majority of Russian citizens saw the reaction of the Russian leadership as an entirely justified and necessary response and were shocked that the West supported Saakashvili. Conversely, the West was appalled at the lack of self-critical voices and the jingoism that accompanied Russia's actions in the Georgia crisis. Secondly, he notes a change in Russian foreign policy. In Lukyanov's opinion Russia is no longer primarily concerned with integration into the international system but with consolidating its own sphere of influence.

Source: The World Factbook

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A five-point programme formulated by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev following the war in Georgia emphasises Russia's right to intervene to defend Russian citizens abroad. In the aftermath of the war in Georgia this prerogative, which Russia had admittedly claimed for itself on several previous occasions, has made its neighbours all the way from the Baltic to Central Asia sit up and take notice. In another point, reference is made to Russia's zone of interest, which tacitly extends to cover the entire post-Soviet region. This contrasts with other accents in Medvedev's foreign policy statements: his stress on the importance of international law, the renunciation of confrontational politics and his call for a multi-polar world order. Yet in its policy on Georgia Russia acted unilaterally rather than adhering to international law. With its diplomatic recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia it contravened existing UN Security Council resolutions and moved from the "creeping annexation" of these territories of which Georgia has accused it for years to openly treating them as protectorates. Nor has it renounced confrontational politics. For the first time since the beginning of the post-Soviet period Russia has made a show of its military might outside its state territory. Within the post-Soviet region this has led to a polarisation in international relations that has made it difficult for the CIS states to orient their policies in several different directions and thus maintain a balance between Russia and their Western partners.

The outlook for neighbourly relations between Russia and Europe?

Now all eyes are looking beyond Georgia and the Caucasus to other regions that share borders with both the European Union and Russia. They have turned towards the Black Sea region, and in particular Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula – a focal point for Russian-Ukrainian tensions that could become extremely risky. Here in the Crimea there is an explosive combination of factors that could cause the Georgia crisis to spread to the Black Sea region: Russian citizens living in the "near abroad", Russia's Black Sea Fleet stationed at Sevastopol, the collision of conflicting versions of history. And then there is yet another secession conflict that remains unresolved in the Black Sea region – that between Moldova and Transnistria, in which Russia also plays a key role and is presently trying to gain a monopoly position over other parties engaged in the effort to resolve the conflict.

This poses a challenge for both the EU's and Germany's policy towards the East. In the past Germany in particular has supported both causes: Europe's partnership with Russia and the sovereignty of the "newly independent states" in the region of the collapsed Soviet Union. Germany was a driving force behind the expansion of the EU's neighbourhood policy to the Caucasus and the devising of an EU strategy on Central Asia. As far as Germany is concerned the big question for Russia is: What do you think about the sovereignty of your neighbours? According to Benita Ferrero-Waldner, EU Commissioner for External Relations, the EU is now in a hurry to boost its neighbourhood policy in the East. The details are scheduled to be presented in early December. The developments in Georgia, she says, have created a "sense of urgency". She adds that almost all the doors to Europe are now open to its neighbours in the post-Soviet area – with the exception of the door leading to membership. Moreover, with its monitoring mission the EU has now become one of the main guarantors for the continuation of the truce in Georgia. But naturally, critical questions in connection with the five-day war are to be directed not only at Russia, but also at the Georgian side.

A second Rose Revolution?

The post-war period in Georgia could possibly see a return to the crisis in domestic politics that loomed in the run-up to the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections and which called President Saakashvili and his autocratic style of government into question. While the war was going on most of the opposition forces made temporary peace with the government. As long as the Russian troops were stationed in Georgia and Moscow was justifying its military measures among other things as a means of achieving a "change of regime", the nation made a patriotic show of solidarity with its president, whom under other circumstances it would have been bombarding with critical questions about his offensive in South Ossetia. In the meantime the time has come to ask questions: Nino Burdjanadze, the former speaker of the parliament of Georgia who has now joined the opposition, recently published 43 questions on the war that pertain to the phase leading up to military engagement, the beginning of the military conflict, the course of the conflict and the withdrawal of the troops.

Meanwhile, President Saakashvili is busy announcing a "second Rose Revolution”, or in other words, intensified efforts towards democratisation. But in their efforts to support the war-damaged country and bolster its territorial integrity Georgia's Western partners must make a critical assessment of the results of the "first Rose Revolution". This applies particularly to the policy of forced reintegration and repatriation of breakaway regions under Georgian statehood. With its combination of peace initiatives and military initiatives regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia this conflict policy was ill-suited to creating a sense of trust between the parties in this internal dispute. It thus aided Russia's efforts to become involved as a protecting power for the two breakaway regions. According to the Georgian ombudsman, in the end the powerful elite surrounding Saakashvili had become so encapsulated and disconnected from society that it was barely capable of making sensible decisions. Western solidarity with Georgia vis-à-vis Russia's power politics and massive financial aid for civilian reconstruction must now be coupled with stricter conditions.

Uwe Halbach

Uwe Halbach works with the Russia/CIS research group at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Foundation of Science and Politics) in Berlin.
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Further articles on the subject » EU enlargement, » International Relations, » Security Policy / Crises / War, » Russia, » Europe, » Eastern Europe, » Georgian Republic
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