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"Counterinsurgency" – New Types of NATO Operations?, by Jochen Hippler

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By means of NATO's 1999 strategy and their operations since the beginning the 1990s (especially since the invasion of Afghanistan), NATO and its members have opened the door to unconventional forms of operations that contain elements of counterinsurgency and nation-building in very different contexts and under very different names. This goes both for unilateral and multilateral operations as well as for operations organised by NATO itself. Not all current and future operations will be as dramatic as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, but they will face problems that occurred there in different, milder or similar shapes. If NATO or its members continue to end up in such situations without the necessary conditions for success (coherent political aims, a serious political overall strategy and, especially, a sustainable social basis in the target country), such operations are likely to intensify conflicts and increase the level of violence in the countries concerned. This is neither in the interest of the countries affected nor generally in that of the intervening states.

We can see the consequences of such policies in Iraq. That's why it is very important that other NATO members, instead of gradually adopting US counterinsurgency strategies, develop their own strategies and concepts that are coherent, effective and manage conflicts, provided these member-states do not pursue hegemonic interests but are interested in constructive conflict management. That doesn't mean that it might not be possible to tap into some aspects of these concepts, but it would be important for other NATO members to actually focus their policies on their own political and socio-economic solutions instead of making them mere instruments of military operations. Prior to such operations, NATO member-states also need to seriously and systematically review whether the operation target possesses the necessary internal conditions that would guarantee success for the mission. Otherwise, the deployment of troops would be irresponsible – both for a fragile target country and for the soldiers deployed.

Since the end of the 1990s, NATO has been searching for its raison d'etre by means of a range of possible and desirable aims and intentions. This is not a "strategy”, however. A real strategy would weigh objectives more, put them into concrete relation to the available means and stipulate how to achieve them by using such means. That is the reason why NATO and many of its members have the choice to either hide their deficiencies behind euphonious words and adopt ready-made concepts and strategies or to finally make an effort to put in some serious and creative conceptual work for current and future operations.

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