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Counter-Terrorism: Guaranteeing Security or Jeopardising Freedom?

"Security" and "Freedom" are regarded as basic human requirements. Both values often conflict with each other. Patricia Schneider and Erwin Müller ask how security can be guaranteed without restricting individual freedom.

In these times of globalisation and confrontation with international terrorism, international institutions are now also assigning themselves the task of "generating security". They argue that given the international nature of today's terrorism individual states are no longer in a position to deal with it alone. Not least among such institutions is the European Union.

Operation of an anti-terror squad in Copenhagen
Photo:AP

Whenever talk turns to security matters the concept of freedom generally also comes into the discussion. "Security" and "freedom" have always been perceived as basic human requirements and therefore as fundamental, but often conflicting, values. They are seen, to a greater or lesser extent, as opposites: the greater the one variable, the smaller the other; the more security you have, the less freedom there will be - and vice versa. Accordingly, state policies, or rather the policies of the constitutional state whose legitimation is based on protection ("security") and respect for human dignity ("freedom") as enshrined in a catalogue of human and civil rights, move between these two poles.

This concept applies to the fight against crime in general as well as the fight against terrorism in particular. Because the relationship between freedom and security is seen as being of a conflicting or antagonistic nature, the challenge is to find the ideal balance between the two values,. In the following this point of view, which is particularly widespread among social scientists, critical journalists and civil rights movements, will be referred to as school of thought A.

In addition to school of thought A there is a second point of view, which is the preferred view of politicians dealing with security issues (school of thought B). They see a positive correlation between the two values: the more security there is, the more freedom there will also be. Some followers of school of thought B, for instance certain members of the German government, go so far as to claim that "without security there can be no freedom". According to this theory security is a necessary precondition for freedom. In this case the relationship between the two values could therefore be described as harmonious or even as one of mutual dependence.

What initially appears to be a stark contrast between the two positions can be explained: the two parties are simply referring to different kinds of freedom. School of thought A is concerned with freedom from state oppression, while the second school of thought is talking about freedom from the threat of terrorism through private agents. Consequently the positions of the two schools are both fundamentally plausible, but nonetheless irreconcilable owing to an inability to find alternative solutions. This is reflected in the many discussions between the adherents of the two schools of thought, who constantly talk at cross purposes.

What do these facts mean for efforts to find an ideal balance between security and freedom? In the case of school of thought B the answer is unproblematic: the greater the one variable (security), the greater the other will also be (freedom). If security has a price, it is not one that entails loss of freedom (but rather the additional financial costs of reinforcing the security apparatus by increasing funding for the police, the secret services and the military, for instance).

The case of school of thought A is much more complicated: the two values have a negative impact on each other. Therefore the solution cannot be the obvious approach, of maximising both values: maximising security would mean minimising or even eliminating freedom entirely. The same applies for the reverse case. Therefore optimisation, rather than maximisation, is the goal.

This problem is particularly well-known in the field of economics: the price (P) of a product should be as high as possible, but so should its sales (S). These two goals are diametrically opposed to each other because the higher the price, the fewer buyers there will be. Dumping prices will of course send sales soaring, but this is not the optimal solution. The objective is thus to generate as much turnover (T) as possible, where turnover is the product of price and sales: T = P x S. This formula describes a reverse parabola with a vertex. The optimal combination of the two variables exists at this maximum peak. All other combinations are sub-optimal. In this particular case the difficulty lies in the fact that there can be no exact calculations for the values of freedom and security. Unlike price and sales, these two variables are hardly quantifiable. The important point, therefore, is to understand the underlying principle and act accordingly.

In any case, any policy for combating terrorism that aims to be at once purpose-oriented, ethically responsible and in accordance with the rule of law must be guided by the following minimum standards of not only effectiveness and efficiency but also respect for the law. This is the only way to guarantee that the policy does not restrict the freedom of those to be protected without providing them appropriate compensation in terms of additional security.

• The fight against terrorism should be organised at an international level (thus also within the framework of the EU) so as to have a genuine chance of winning the battle against cross-border terrorism.

• In this context it could employ all all measures allowed in a constitutional state, including preventive police action as well as punishment instruments (principle of legality).

• Ineffective, symbolic security policies, which only serve to create a false sense of security and are aimed exclusively at soothing fears and boosting loyalty, are to be avoided (principle of purpose-orientation).

• As far as possible, counter-terrorist measures are to be designed in such a way that they boost security without encroaching on civil liberties. Where such encroachment is inevitable due to the nature of the problem any potential gains in terms of security are to be so substantial, in comparison to the loss of freedom involved, that the benefits considerably outweigh the cost. The cost is determined by a binding assessment of losses and gains (principle of economy).

• A set of core liberties, determined according to constitutional criteria, should be excluded from all assessments of appropriateness of measures. These liberties can be termed "assessment-proof". This is particularly the case where human dignity, which is defined as "inviolable" in Germany's Basic Law, is affected. In other words, at this point any counter-terrorism measure--including one which might be extremely effective--would be absolutely out of the question. This exclusion applies for as long as states are unwilling to sacrifice freedom in its totality for the sake of a "security" which would then be meaningless, superfluous, and lacking any value worth preserving.

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