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Magazine / Current / French Presidency / Article | 26/06/2008
Sarkozy's European politics
by Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet
For the first time since the french no to the European Constitution in 2005 France will hold the Presidency of the European Council. Nicolas Sarkozy has set important goals for this period. Among these is the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. How is France going to deal with this challenge after the Irish no? Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet offers possible solutions.
On 1.7.2008, Nicolas Sarkozy will take over presidency of the European Council for the first time. The Irish "no" to the Lissabon Treaty on the 12.06.2008 will prove a heavy strain on this EU presidency and will to a large extent ruin Sarkozy's ambitious plan to shift France into becoming the dazzling centre of an innovative, revived and self-confident EU.
In this recently opened abysm of a European crisis situation, it is all the more important to get to know Sarkozy's intentions for European politics, and above all his leadership and skills in compromising. EU Europe can only make its way out of this crisis if the president of the European Council is capable of reconciliation and of faithful collaboration, and knows how to bring closed ranks behind him in order to make Ireland see sense. Is Sarkozy the right man for the job?
Sarkozy's brilliant European stage debut
The election of the UMP candidate, Nicolas Sarkozy, on 6.5.2007 to the position of state president freed France from the crippling state of shock which had afflicted the country after the negative referendum from 29.05.2005. By developing his new vision of a "Europe which equips itself with the means to act and to protect" - the candidate's own words in February 2007 in front of the EP in Strasbourg – Sarkozy wasn't only trying to pick up on the fears and hesitancies of the French, and to overcome them. He was also offering France a way out of the "Non" cul-de-sac with his clear proclamation aiming at a newly-negotiated EU Treaty achieved via parliament ratification and not via a referendum. For this reason, he was justified in announcing on the evening of his election that France "was back in Europe again". His idea of reviving the constitutional treaty under the euphemistic name of "traité simplifié" (a simplified Treaty) truly rescued EU Europe from the (previous) constitutional crisis.
However, the manner in which the new state president claimed his portion of the success for the tenacious and equilibrium-orientated methods of the European Council president Angela Merkel encountered mystification and criticism. Some people soon realised that "speedy Sarko" – the nickname Sarkozy was quick to gain as an unusually head-on and high-speed state president - could become a difficult and awkward partner. And indeed, "the earthquake called Sarkozy" (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10.7.2007) made France and the partner states catch their breaths with a barrage of ideas, advances and initiatives which often blatantly pursued national political interests. Yet the French soon became weary of the hyperactiveness of their president, and considered his "bling-bling" politics; this fishing for effects and the placing of his private life on show in a permanent and ubiquitous self-representation as being detrimental to the country's reputation (survey, October 2007 ; June 2008 ). This was an important reason for Sarkozy to create a calmer image of a more worldly-wise statesman, which he has worked on for several months now.
Sarkozy's central projects
Sarkozy's hyperactivity during his first year in office makes analysis of his politics more difficult. However, it is clear to see a trend in foreign politics and in the European political field indicating that Sarkozy is aiming to substantially enhance Frances' international and European role. This priority is tangibly supported by the numerous economic and industrial political advances made, mainly recognisable via a pronounced "patriotisme économique" in currency politics, in aeroplane construction and in the nuclear sector.
Sarkozy is pursuing this major project; the international enhancement of France, on several fronts. As well as his cumulative attempts to establish France once more as an important protagonist in the Middle East, his advances for his country's complete return to NATO and for the creation of a new Mediterranean Union are particularly meaningful, as they show clear connections to current French European politics.
France, the ESDP and NATO
In spite of the new coat of paint which Sarkozy has prescribed for his foreign and security policies and which is mainly characterized by its exceptionally US-friendly attitude, the new state president has remained faithful to a central constant of French-European politics; the attempt to create a Europe which is as strong as possible as well as being capable of action in security and defence politics. Sarkozy has made further reinforcement and expansion of the still-young European security and defence politics (ESDP) a focal point for his time in office. However, in realising this priority, he is taking a radically new, highly promising path by combining ESDP reinforcement with the (complete) return of France into NATO structures.
In the past, advancements made by France for the set-up and development of the ESDP generally came up against scepticism or even rejection. This was the case because France, which was not a (full) NATO member, was suspected - not unjustifiably - of trying to weaken the union and of attempting to build up a counterweight against the US hegemony. At this point, Sarkozy has therefore carried out a substantial political change: he is relying on the fact that the attempts made by France to strengthen the ESDP would become acceptable if such advances were made by the country as full members of NATO. For this reason, the following has been official since September 2007: Sarkozy and his Minister of Defence, Hervé Morin, are attempting to complete the return of France into the NATO, which was initiated under President Chirac in 1995, but which came to a halt due to US blockades.
As well as the enhancement of the ESDP, France has other strategic intentions which could be furthered by its return to the ESDP. Since NATO has often been active "out of area", France has participated in all operations and is the fourth-largest provider of contributions; yet it does not possess full rights to determine, plan or make decisions in the military Councils - in spite of having around 300 French liaison officers in the NATO. Germany and Great Britain send out four to six times more NATO personnel and occupy the most important European positions of command. Paris wants to put an end to this. In order to give his plans for return credibility, Sarkozy announced at the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest that he would send an additional 1000 soldiers to Afghanistan.
The return of France into the NATO really does open up new perspectives for the ESDP. In contrast to his predecessors, who pursued visions of European autonomy and who therefore rejected close cooperation between the ESDP and the NATO, Sarkozy is relying on stronger interrelationships between the NATO and the ESDP: whilst the EU received access to NATO resources via the Berlin Plus Agreement of 2003, the NATO may be able to resort to ESDP civil capabilities – "Berlin Plus reversed", one might say. In this way, Sarkozy introduces reality to the EU-27 calculation, which has no more chances whatsoever of realising European foreign and security politics based on autonomy and counter-power formation. Therefore, this central political change made by Sarkozy evidences great innovation potential which can be used even without the Lissabon Treaty, as the decisions become intergovernmental.
Sarkozy's Union for the Mediterranean – more detrimental than beneficial?
The plan which was officially launched in Tangier in October 2007 for the creation of a "Union for the Mediterranean" (UfM) has occupied the EU like no other intention put forward by Sarkozy - it has in fact shocked some people. With the UfM, Sarkozy wishes to realise a "dream of peace and justice" between both banks of the Mediterranean. This is to be implemented via actual projects such as keeping the Mediterranean clean, improving transport connections, expanding renewable energy sources and creating a Mediterranean University area. As the original plan only allowed for European participation from the Iberian states, Italy, Greece and of course France, it was feared that this might cause a divide in Europe. If the French suggestion was copied, people said, then European neighbourhood policies could be damaged and regional egos and priorities could start to predominate. After particularly severe resistance from Germany, the European Council heavily curtailed Sarkozy's plans in March 2008 by declaring the UfM as a new edition of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership which had been running since 1995. In this way, the UfM would be updating the so-called Barcelona Process, thereby integrating all 27 EU member states and 12 southern states bordering the Mediterranean Sea. Since, by order of the European Council in May, the Commission has specified complex suggestions for UfM structures and rules for the planned northern-southern co-presidencies, the fears that France might dominate the project and use it to its own advantage should be appeased.
On July 13, 2008, the project is to be launched in state under the title "Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean" in Paris. Yet in spite of intensive campaigning, Paris had difficulty convincing the southern states bordering the Mediterranean Sea of its project and that they should join it. Because they considered themselves insufficiently integrated into the preliminary work, Algeria's President, Bouteflika, and Libya's head of state, Gaddafi have cancelled. We are still waiting for confirmation from the controversial Syrian, al-Assad. The success of the UfM is certainly not guaranteed, in particular because it, like Euro-Med, is heavily encumbered with the Israeli-Arabian conflict. Up to now, in any case, Sarkozy has done more damage than good with this project so close to his heart.
The French presidency programme – reliant on support
The French presidency programme, which has not yet been issued out of deference to Ireland comprises, as well as the major ESDP relaunch project, of the following focal points: energy and climate change, immigration and agricultural policies. These topics prove that a Council presidency is always obliged to further long-term EU targets and to finalise them if possible.
In the field of immigration, the regulation of which was a concern of Sarkozy's during his time in office as Minister of the Interior, France refers to the comprehensive bundle of measures which the EU has developed over the past years, and suggests a "European Pact on immigration and asylum". Here, France is trying to force the definition of so-called access policies into the EU, consisting of a combination of hard measures against illegal migration, in particular consistent deportation and better monitoring of outer borders via Frontex, as well as wide-ranging aid for migrants' countries of origin. In addition, France wants to enforce the principle of "immigration choisie" meaning that to encourage circular migration, mainly of qualified migrants, the doors of the EU are to be opened intermittently. In the field of energy and climate politics, the French Council presidency has to cast the ambitious promises made by the EU on CO2 reductions from the year 2007 into firm resolutions and obligations. As far as agricultural politics is concerned, France would like to re-discuss things in the light of the present food crisis.
For all these topics, Sarkozy's capabilities for teamwork and finding a consensus of opinion is required (and French-European diplomacy). It was certainly one of the most striking learning effects for state president Sarkozy to have to recognise, like his predecessor, that a most close and faithful partnership with Germany is the only reliable key to the success of French-European politics. It is well known that the relationship between Merkel and Sarkozy is turbulent. There is bad chemistry between the two of them, which Sarkozy attempts to play down via over-exaggerated eulogies on the chancellor - such as recently, when Merkel was presented with the Karlspreis; "We are now friends forever" he announced at this occasion in Aachen. Merkel, on the other hand, mistrusts Sarkozy, above all because of his UfM initiative and his general leadership style, which is not particularly consultation-orientated. It must be seen as an advancement that Sarkozy solicited for German support before July 1 for his state presidency. This meant that he was most forthcoming towards the Chancellor on June 10 in Bavarian Straubing over the argument about car exhaust fume reductions. Even if this is an initial blow for environmental protection, this German-French compromise signals that Paris and Berlin are finally acting together again as an "engine of integration", which is also - or precisely - absolutely vital in the EU-27 in order to keep the Union on course for integration.
Sarkozy has also proved capable of learning from his mistakes when dealing with the new member states and Turkey. He would like to open up a new chapter of collaboration with the new member states after his predecessor Chirac affronted them with reference to the Iraq war by saying "they had missed a good opportunity to remain silent". Apart from that, he needs support, at least from Poland, if he really wants to further the ESDP. As far as his previous loud denunciations of Turkeys' entry into the EU are concerned; here he has become far more discrete, in particular because the constitutional reform presently being debated in France might well save his skin - the plan is to hold referendums whenever a state representing more than 5% of the EU population wishes to gain entry.
Crisis management instead of treaty implementation: what can Sarkozy achieve?
Using these focus themes for his French Council presidency, which are registered in the EU's long-term agenda, Sarkozy could well earn merit in spite of the Irish debacle; above all if he - as he promised in Aachen on May 1, 2008 - allows "Europe to have the advantage" over national political interests and - to coin a phrase from the European Minister, Jean-Pierre Jouyet - "does nothing without our partners".
In contrast to this, the work programme for the French presidency which is supposed to prepare direct implementation of the Lissabon Treaty has become waste paper after the Irish "no". Originally, candidates for the offices of president of the European Council, high-up representatives of the EU foreign and security policies and the Commission president were to be determined under the French presidency. It was also planned to define the structure and design of the planned European Foreign Service. We can assume that nothing of that will happen.
Instead of this, Sarkozy will have to enter the troublesome levels of crisis management; above all in order to achieve the ratifications which still have to be effected. Only this strategy, as the current EU line of approach signifies, can hope to rescue the desperately-needed new EU Treaty, because Ireland may then agree to a second referendum. The "yes" to this on June 18 from Great Britain is a very good sign. However, constructive French crisis management requires that Sarkozy plays the role of honest broker for EU interests, putting vanity and self-interest behind him. Should he succeed in this, he would be able to do the EU a great service and to lead France after all these years back into a constructive European-political course. This would achieve a great deal, as Helmut Schmidt's old words of wisdom are still valid even in an EU which has expanded eastwards: "Without France, everything is nothing".
Links on French European politics and on German-French relationships:
Dr. rer. pol.; born 1956; Professor for International Relationships and European Research at the University of Würzburg.
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Original in German
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