Archivo / Magazine / Sociedad / Religion / Análisis | 15/09/2008

Religion in the Greek public sphere

Orthodox Christianity plays an important role in many countries in South-eastern Europe. Only a few people know what characterises these religious communities. Effie Fokas uses the example of Greece to show how the Orthodox Church influences politics and what this means for Greek society.

Orthodox Christian worshippers during a prayer.

Orthodoxy and Christianity in Europe

Christian Orthodoxy is amongst the most obscured presences on the European religious scene. In spite of the inclusion of large Orthodox populations in the European Union with the last waves of EU expansion, awareness of Orthodoxy in its multiple expressions remains fairly clouded and undeveloped beyond its borders. There are of course several seemingly logical reasons for this, including the lack of a unified representative voice comparable to the Roman Catholic Pope, as well as the fact that much of the Orthodox population now part of the EU was, until relatively recently, under Communist rule. Meanwhile, the faith's emphasis on mystery and ritual, may also render it less conducive to easy comprehension from an external perspective. Certainly there is a sense of strong difference from Western Christianity which, for some, rightfully awards Orthodoxy's placing in Samuel Huntington's civilizational divides. These differences are generally explained with reference to the fact that the Orthodox world did not experience the Renaissance or the Enlightenment Rather, centuries of Ottoman rule, and the fact of Communist rule for generations of Orthodox peoples, are thought to have led to underdevelopment, especially in terms of democratic mindset, in many European Orthodox contexts.

Former Greece's Orthodox Church Archbishop Christodoulos, and Pope Benedict XVI, 2006. It was the first visit of a leader of the greek-orthodox church in the Vatican.

These generalized conceptions are buttressed by the existence of multiple offices representing Orthodoxy in Brussels rather than one voice unified under the Ecumenical Patriarchate, as well as by events in the Orthodox world which have received international press coverage: the Greek Orthodox Church's resistance to a visit by the Pope in 2001; the subsequent tensions between it and the Ecumenical Patriarchate beginning in 2003 which led to Archbishop Christodoulos' temporary status of being 'out of communion' with the Ecumenical Patriarchate; and the tension between the Orthodox Church of Macedonia and, in particular, the Orthodox Church of Serbia, especially over the latter's refusal to recognize the autocephalous status of the former. Other events from the Orthodox world which reach the international press are likewise damning, though different in nature: a case in point is the Jerusalem Patriarchate's controversial sale of lands to the Israeli state (2005), in exchange for the latter's recognition of the newly elected Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem. Indeed, media representations often reflect what Richard Clogg describes as 'casual but damaging ignorance'.

A superficial glance into the place of religion in the Greek public sphere offers an exaggerated image similar to that presented of Orthodoxy in general in the international press and much academic literature: the headline-grabbing events paint a fairly bleak picture, including those already mentioned, but also the coverage of church-state struggle over the identity card issue; and the scandals which swept through the church in 2005. A result is a picture of a nationalistic, politicized and corrupt church which is exceptionally incompatible with the norms of European secular neutrality.

But this suggests an inevitability and offers little by way of understanding the actual factors underlying such developments related to Greek Orthodoxy. Instead, what is required is insight into a number of contingencies, including the historically developed relationship between religion and national identity in the Greek case; the particular relationship between church and state that developed in Greece on the basis of the latter; and the role of agency and, in particular, church leadership.

Historical contingencies in the religion-national identity link

The historical links between religion and national identity in Greece are broad and deep. It will suffice to highlight, simply for indicative purposes, certain climactic points in the evolution of this relationship in modern Greece. The first is the experience of the Orthodox Church under the Ottoman Empire and, specifically, the role that the experience of the Ottoman millet system played in consolidating religious and national identity. Under the millet system, non-Muslim communities were divided into religious groups and given 'protected' status: in exchange for the payment of a special tax, these religious groups were allowed to live within the Muslim state without converting to Islam, but as second-class subjects. The millets enjoyed a measure of autonomy and were represented by their religious leaders in their dealings with the Sublime Porte. Although the Orthodox millet was ecumenical and multinational in nature, in reality it was largely Greek-dominated: the succession of Patriarchs was Greek, and the social administration was almost exclusively in the hands of Greeks. Accordingly, beyond the institutional role of the church, the church had an important psychological function for the Greeks under Ottoman rule: the church was seen as provider and protector of the people and preserver of their national identity.

National independence in Greece

Greek national independence was won after revolution against the Ottoman Empire (1821-29). Significantly, the establishment of an Autocephalous Church of Greece was the decision of a (Bavarian and Protestant) three-man regency council of the (Roman Catholic) King Otto who ruled newly independent Greece. It was deemed by the regency that political independence also required ecclesiastical independence. The fact that autocephaly was a revolutionary act – i.e. a split from the Patriarchate without the latter's consent – signified the attainment of the fullest extent of national independence and national identity.

"The Megali Idea”

A further climactic period in the developing links between Orthodoxy and Greek national identity is to be found in the Megali Idea ('Grand Idea') for redemption of Greek still under Turkish rule outside the boundaries of the Greek state. Here the aims of the state for its expansion coincided with the visions of religious nationalists for 'redemption' of Orthodox peoples. The Megali Idea entailed a clear blending of millenarianism with nationalism, and of Orthodoxy with Greek national identity. It collapsed with the defeat of the Greek army in Asia Minor in 1922. As a result of the exchange of populations foreseen by the Lausanne Treaty following the war (1923), Greek society became religiously homogenous (97% Orthodox).

Legal framework of church-state relations

The legal-framework for contemporary church-state relations in Greece is set out in the 1975 Constitution that came into effect after the return to democracy following military dictatorship in 1967-74. It affirms recognition of Orthodoxy as the 'prevailing' faith; guarantees religious freedoms of conscience and of worship; and sets out 'development of religious conscience of youth' as one of the aims of national education. In combination, the constitution leads to significant entanglements between church and state, to privileges enjoyed by the Orthodox Church at the expense of minority faiths represented in Greece, and to certain patterns in church-state relations.

In terms of entanglements: the clergy of the Orthodox Church of Greece are remunerated and pensioned by the state; the state pays the salaries and pensions of the clergy, pastors and lay employees of the Orthodox Church, and the church is exempted from taxation. Further, the Statutory Charter of the church must be passed by the Plenary Session of Parliament, and the Archbishop presides over each opening session of Parliament. Of especially symbolic impact is the fact that church and state leaders often jointly preside over state functions and national holiday celebrations.

Regarding privileges of the church over minority faiths, there are several examples, including privileges related to the building and operation of places of worship for non-Orthodox peoples in Greece, and the application of legal provisions against proselytism, which has led to certain path-breaking cases against the Greek state in the European Court of Human Rights.

Religious Minorities

It is a 1939 law, enacted under the Metaxas dictatorship, which remains in force as determinant of the rights of minority faiths to construct churches and operate places of worship. According to this law, beyond the usual building permit, the construction of any church or place of worship requires an application for permission submitted to the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs who, in turn, seeks the approval of the Greek Orthodox bishop presiding in the particular geographic area. The application must be signed by 50 families residing in the area. The local bishop is to forward his opinion to the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs on the 'necessity' of such a building. If a church is built without license, this is punishable with jail and the local metropolitan has the right to call for demolition of the building.

In fact, though, the approval of the local bishop is, in legal terms, an 'opinion' which the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs is required to hear, but not to obey, in deciding on issuance of the permits. However, if a Ministry chooses to permit the establishment against the bishop's recommendation, it would have to justify its decision. According to Charalambos Papastathis, in practice, the bishops are almost always against such developments and the Ministry does not as a rule oppose them . Thus, in reality, the dominant tendency today still gives priority to the safeguarding of the prevailing religion over true religious freedom.

Conflicts between church and state

Finally, in the domain of church-state conflict: since the 1974 return to democracy there have been three major instances of church-state conflict: conflict over church property; over changes to the civil code; and over the reference to religious affiliation on the national identity cards. By far the most potent of these conflicts was that over the identity cards – beginning in 2000 when the then Prime Minister Simitis announced the planned removal of religious affiliation from the national identity cards:

Archbishop Christodoulos (in power from 1998 to 2008) was very much the protagonist in this issue, from the first moment of criticising the state for taking such a policy decision without consulting the church. Christodoulos sought to reverse the decision by gathering signatures to call for a referendum. In order to gather these signatures, he relied very much on the religion-national identity link by representing the church as a protector of the nation. Christodoulos lost the identity-card battle with the state, in the sense that religious affiliation was, in fact, removed from the new identity cards being printed. But he won the war in the sense that, to a large extent the next prefectural and municipal elections were held in the shadow of the identity cards, with Christodoulos hinting at church-favoured candidates in his widely publicised sermons, and with candidates of both main parties seeking, in an especially public way, his blessing prior to the elections.

The role of church leadership

Archbishop Ieronymos II is the leader of Greece's Orthodox Church since February 2008. He succeeded Archbishop Christodoulos who died in January 2008

Archbishop Christodoulos' death in early 2008 was followed by the election of Archbishop Ieronymos. Change introduced by Ieronymos is a recurrent theme in the newspaper coverage of the transition from Christodoulos to Ieronymos. The term 'new page' factors prominently: 'the new page in the book of the Church of Greece seems that it will differ a lot from the previous one', according to one news publication. His shunning of television cameras was especially striking to certain journalists: 'without clanging of cymbals and cameras the new archbishop of Athens changes the face of the Church of Greece. He brings it closer to Orthodox tradition of humility and love towards fellow human beings'. In an article entitled 'Mr. Ieronymos changes everything', the new situation is described in terms of television cameras being replaced by welfare concerns. 'This is how we want the church', suggests Member of Parliament Nicholas Sifounakis.

Special attention was paid, in the days following the election, to Ieronymos' perspective on church-state relations. Prefaced by a journalist's announcement that 'the views of the Archbishop have won the support of most of the political world', Ieronymos is cited in stating

We are not political but ecclesiastical men. We are first and necessarily agents and expressers of the prophetic gift of the priesthood. This means that the church has a duty to express its voice not in order to contest the institutions, or to get involved in policies and party disputes, but to express its anxiety when it feels that the degradation of morals and values undermines the future of the people of God [notably, not of the nation]...

Ieronymos' church-state perspectives were put to the test quite forcefully in his first weeks in the archbishopric, and in ways again indicating the complex interplay between the religion-nation link, church-state relations, and the role of agency. The first challenge came within days of his enthronement, in the form of another revival of 'the Skopiano' – the issue of the use of the name 'Macedonia' by Greece's former-Yugoslav neighbour. The Holy Synod, convening for the first time under Ieronymos, rebuffed the idea of a mass rally on the issue, calling for 'unity, consensus, maturity and prudence'. According to one newspaper article, 'The election of Ieronymos as Archbishop of Athens and All Greece is a spoke in the wheel of all those in the Holy Synod…who thought they could influence foreign policy'. By 'those in the Holy Synod' the article means (and indicates) a particular bishop who, prior to the Holy Synod's aforementioned statement on the matter, had declared that there would 'definitely be one – two – good mass rallies' on the issue. This was the first clear sign of major differences in opinion in the Holy Synod under the new archbishop.

The second challenge to Ieronymos' church-state perspectives – and, more poignantly, challenge to synodal unity – arose over the government's plans to introduce a cohabitation law. The Archbishop's stated stance on the matter was in line with his aforementioned perspective on the place of the church in relation to the state and to politics:

There are clear limits and in respect to this matter, the church does not have the right to ask for it [the cohabitation law] to be watered down or to have any other request granted...

Yet three days later (17 March) the Holy Synod announced its opposition to the government's plan. More shocking still was the wording of the Synod's opinion: 'The church accepts and blesses the established wedding, according to Orthodox traditions, and considers any other type of similar relationship to be prostitution' . Clearly, Ieronymos' perspective was not shared by all the Synod. Ieronymos reportedly accepted that the Synod's majority opinion on the draft law was negative, but was unaware of the wording of the Synod's official statement on the matter (as is clear in a newspaper article entitled 'Ieronymos ire') . In his next Sunday sermon, Ieronymos called for a more tolerant church, suggesting that the church should be more open-minded and less moralizing: 'the church is what Christ wants it to be, not what people want it to be…We are giving the impression that the role of the church is to force people to be good'.

Such tensions continue and many others are certain to arise. It should be clear, from this brief attention to the question of agency within the church during this limited time period, that there are vastly different perspectives amongst the church hierarchy on the place of the church in the public sphere, leading to vastly different actions on the part of the church in relation to the state.

Expectations for the future

It is far too early to assess what might be the impact of the new church leadership on the place of religion in Greek society. Academic and media-based discussions in the aftermath of the archbishopric elections focused on the need for church-state separation once and for all. However, church-state separation, in and of itself, is not a panacea for the difficulties facing Greek Orthodoxy in terms of adapting to a new situation of more religious heterogeneity and to a reality of a more secularised society.

Certainly formally removing the constitutional privileges enjoyed by the Greek Orthodox Church is a healthy starting point, one which could have a trickle-down effect into society in general. But such measures would have to be accompanied by other efforts which will effectuate a long-term, but steady and coherent process of change – efforts focused on the aforementioned operative and combatable factors which lead to limitations on religious freedoms and equality. For example, alteration of the way history is taught in schools and the place of religion and the church in this, thus helping lead to a better educated public less accepting of exploitations of church-state links; support for politicians risking political losses by resisting inappropriate interferences from the church, if and as they arise and, by the same token, some system of reprimand for those politicians who instead manipulate church-state links to their political benefit; and support for 'progressive' clergy who resist the banal and clichéd links between religion and nation, church and state and, rather, seek to cultivate the church's spiritual mission. Only time will tell; but the early signs suggest that the new church leadership is very much in support of change in these directions.

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