After years of training and preparation, the operation to liberate Mosul, the last remaining stronghold of Isis in Iraq, has begun. Over the coming weeks, if not months, the western-led coalition both on the ground and in the skies will almost certainly signal the end of Isis’s control of territory in Iraq and will be the death knell of the so-called caliphate.
But what comes next? Iraq lacks the resources and the capacity to rebuild the towns and cities that have been destroyed since the campaign against Isis was launched two years ago. The Iraqi state is a fragile, if not failed, state and in some areas (including those outside Isis-controlled territory) it is no longer the principal provider of basic services and security.
Iraq continues to suffer the consequences of corruption, sectarianism and dysfunctional governance, as well as a plethora of Shia militias and a highly fragmented security environment. In the coming period, the multi-phased operation to liberate Mosul will intensify. There are uncertainties surrounding the degree of resistance that Isis will provide. It is a largely opportunistic organisation that exploits and capitalises on the weaknesses of its opponents, using divisionary tactics to exhaust the resources of its opponents while shifting its focus to other areas.
The group is unlikely to go head-to-head with Iraqi security forces and will almost certainly revert to insurgency mode and continue its fight in the urbanised environment that Mosul offers. That means it will blend into the local population, making it difficult to distinguish between the jihadi fighters and civilians.
The strategy for liberating Mosul, much like the anti-Isis campaign more generally, is to clear areas of Isis fighters, maintain control over territory retaken from the group and rebuild the destroyed towns and cities. But who will do the rebuilding? Aside from Iraq’s lack of resources to finance this rehabilitation, it also lacks a regular military that is capable, and that has the support of local populations to sustain control of territories captured from Isis.
Arab Sunni tribal groups are expected to do most of the fighting in the city itself but these groups have their own rivalries and do not necessarily have support and legitimacy among locals in Mosul, particularly since they receive support and training from rival political factions in Iraq and external powers that are widely disdained by locals.
The Mosul operation carries particular weight because the city’s liberation would effectively signal the start of the “day after Isis”. There is an array of different powerful and heavily armed groups who have set upon Mosul and they have conflicting agendas and ambitions. Each see their influence and control over the province as potential leverage in relation to the outstanding disputes they have had over the past decade over territory, power-sharing and Iraq’s energy resources.
There are intense rivalries between Shia militias who function autonomously of the state and Kurdish peshmerga and between these actors and the Iraqi security forces, which answer to the Baghdad government. Iran also has a significant presence and backs Shia militias, who have threatened to wage a war against Turkey unless it withdraws its troops from Mosul. Turkey has stationed them there to contain groups like the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK), which has fought the Turkish state for a series of political and cultural rights for Turkey’s Kurdish population. The local Turkomen and Yazidi population have additionally formed their own militias under the patronage of local and foreign backers.
In other words, the conditions that gave rise to Isis in the first place are still there and have been exacerbated, rather than alleviated, over the past two years since the jihadis took control of Mosul in 2014. While President Obama clearly does not want Isis (or rather the “caliphate”) to outlive his presidency, there are no guarantees the US and the international community will continue their support and help to remedy these shortcomings, as well as mediate between rival factions.
In the short- and medium-term, Isis will continue to commit terrorist atrocities such as the July bombing in Karrada that killed close to 300 people, and it still has its apparatus in Syria as a launching pad for attacks and atrocities elsewhere. This latest offensive on Mosul won’t change that – and without substantial investment for rebuilding it’s unlikely to help Iraq become a more peaceful, stable country.