Home / Press review / Archive / Magazine / Politics / Russia / Commentary

The Importance of the Presidential Elections, by Margareta Mommsen

« back . 1 . 2

When Putin launched another surprise coup on 1st October, he completely relied on the plebiscitary trump. During the party congress of the Kremlin faction "United Russia” he announced that he wanted to lead the party-list for the Duma election himself. Moreover, he considered it a "realistic suggestion” for him to step into the top government position in case of victory. However, as he soon distanced himself from that idea again, wild speculations started about the outcome of "Operation Successor” and about Putin's own political future. Meanwhile, the President and the "United Russia” did not shy away from strictly handling the parliamentary election as a "referendum for Putin”. This was in effect a plain breach of the constitution. It was accepted in order to hold on to the thin thread of a controlled power transfer. While the party pushed its victory – a given anyway – even higher by turning the Duma election into early presidential elections, Putin strengthened his own position of power ahead of the oligarchic clan thanks to a new people's mandate. While both plans worked out, the principle of a democratic contest was left behind once more. The perversion and total control over the Duma election strongly affected the development of a multiple-party system, which had actually been favoured by the Kremlin. After the election, the Duma still presented itself as a "one-party parliament", whereas the mandates won by other powers had to be assigned to two satellite parties of the Kremlin and the Communist opposition, largely co-opted by the system anyway. All this shows that a system of "controlled democracy” can hardly free itself from the straightjacket it fitted itself into. Of course, it does not really help that Putin presented Medvedev's candidacy as a nomination by four political parties, of which two only achieved 2.3 and 1.05% of the votes.

Whereas the appearance of democratic legitimacy for Medvedev's candidacy left a lot to be desired under this aspect, too, it was clear that he predominantly owed his nomination to the balancing of the informal groups within the Kremlin. The conflicts that had publicly started among the different "Siloviki” factions since the beginning of October, made clear that these groups were slipping out of Putin's control, despite his diplomacy. So it seemed all the more urgent to push the liberal candidate's success. To ensure this initiative would work out, Medvedev appealed to Putin straight after his nomination, to become Head of Government after his election. Putin agreed. From now on, the state-controlled media praised the benefits of a strong "Putin-Medvedev tandem”.

The election campaign degenerated into a complete farce, just as it did during Putin's re-election in March 2004. The directors of the Kremlin were keen to ensure the smooth running of "Operation Successor” and not to endanger it with the least disturbing factor. Hence, Mikhail Kasyanov, the representative of the democratic opposition, was not allowed to participate in the elections, even though his chances of victory were minimal anyway, due to the long-lasting marginalisation of liberal powers. While Kasyanov was accused that a part of the 2 million signatures he presented was faulty, Andrej Bogdanov, the "liberal” approved by the Kremlin, was certified a sufficient amount of properly gained signatures. Eventually, this led to the grotesque result that Bogdanov's share of votes amounted to 1.29% and stayed thus considerably below the 2 million votes, which he had apparently presented during his registration. Apparently, the mechanisms of this "controlled democracy” had got caught in their own trap. Actually, Bogdanov's admission to the presidential elections was only meant to ensure that in case Zjuganov and Zhirinovsky stepped down, the elections would preserve their formal competitiveness and thus their lawfulness. Both those candidates displayed unhappiness about their election results (Zjuganov 17.72%, Zhirinovsky 9.34%) and justly lamented the many inconsistencies during the course of the election, as well as Medvedev's refusal to participate in public debates. Principally, the latter's abstinence seemed to stem from obligations he was given by the directors of the Kremlin. Up to the very last minute, they did not want to expose the controlled transfer of power to any risks. So instead, Medvedev had to be content with touring the country in his office as First Deputy Prime Minister and make his predominantly socio-politically oriented agenda accessible to the citizens. All state-run TV channels reported on this extensively. In only two appearances, Medvedev enlightened his viewers about a kind of policy statement for his presidency. It confirmed the liberal orientation of the Kremlin candidate. The message even sounds promising in view of the necessary recovery of long-lost democratic and constitutional values. But how could a new trend succeed and what should it start with? Given the existing circumstances, it would be important to acquire suitable combatants and put them instead of the "Siloviki” into key positions within the government machinery. First, though, it remains to be seen whether it will even be possible to recruit new leadership personnel within the framework of the duumvirate, and after that to break up the crusty mechanisms of the "controlled democracy”.

« back . 1 . 2