SCO: multilateralism minus the West?

Beijing is successfully turning Trump's unpredictable policies to its advantage, Mladá fronta dnes reflects:

“China is gradually managing to change the global balance of power and demonstrate its growing international economic and political clout. Trump is driving other countries into China's arms with his bullying tactics. The most recent example is the heavyweight India, whose president was and is certainly no great admirer of China. Analysts agree that alienating Modi, a key strategic partner long cultivated by America as the centrepiece of its China containment strategy, is a serious mistake on Trump's part.”

Xi is thinking in the medium to long term, La Repubblica puts in:

“There is no rush because time is on Beijing's side, which has set itself a ten-year horizon to once again become the Middle Kingdom and put the long century of the West behind it. To understand where Mao's heir's conviction about the inexorability of the Eurasian project comes from, we must start with the figures: taken together the ten member countries of the SCO account for 80 percent of the world's land mass, 40 percent of its population and 22.5 percent of its GDP. Together with that of the remaining BRICS countries - the economic alliance also co-led by China - that accounts for more than half of global wealth.”

The summit brings a bitter realisation for the EU, writes the taz:

“The People's Republic of China will not budge from Russia's side in the foreseeable future, and it will increasingly position itself as a counterweight to the political West. ... The fact that Beijing is leading an authoritarian, pro-Russian bloc signifies one thing above all: a political middle finger to the West. Just listening carefully to Xi Jinping's speeches made this clear. ... For moral reasons, Europe would do well to remain true to its democratic values and limit its dependence on China. But with a US president who is throwing all the principles of the rule of law overboard at record tempo, a political question of a very pragmatic nature arises: can the EU afford to uphold any morals at all?”

Beijing is profiling itself as a second global power centre, Corriere della Sera observes:

“The presence of Modi, Putin and others such as Turkish President Erdoğan and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian gave Xi the opportunity to relaunch his idea of an alternative to the Western world order. ... At last night's gala dinner, the Chinese president emphasised the convergence of interests among the countries of the 'global South', arguing that the SCO is ready to shoulder 'great responsibility' and bring 'progress and stability to human civilisation' with a 'new type of international relations'.”

Xi Jinping is forging an anti-Western world, writes editor and journalist Vitaly Portnikov in 24tv.ua:

“The Chinese head of state is making it very clear to US President Donald Trump that a very different world exists. A world in which the sanctions and threats from Washington mean nothing. A world in which China - by buying Russian or Iranian oil - is demonstrating that these countries can simply ignore Western sanctions. A world in which, for years now, weapons have been sent to a country to kill civilians in a neighbouring state. In Ukraine we have known for a long time that two political and economic worlds exist. We have known that sanctions cannot work, as it was once assumed in Washington or Brussels that they would.”

The contours of the alliance are still hazy, Handelsblatt notes:

“This is not a military alliance that could be countered with sanctions or deterrence, but rather a flexible network of economic incentives, political loyalties and security deals. But this is precisely where its weaknesses lie. The differences between India and China, the Central Asian republics' mistrust of the Kremlin, the conflict between Pakistan and India: the West can use all of this to keep the fault lines in the alliance open. The SCO is still more of a fragile mosaic than a monolithic bloc.”

The rapprochement between India and China is marked by pragmatism, Helsingin Sanomat explains:

“The thaw began in October 2024, when Xi and Modi agreed to ease visa requirements and trade restrictions. ... This is no love story; it's a pragmatic marriage of convenience in which both sides shamelessly cheat on each other and there is no guarantee of permanence. China is a strategic ally of the Islamic state of Pakistan, and Pakistan is India's arch-enemy. When the nuclear powers India and Pakistan engaged in a week-long war-like conflict in May, behind the scenes at least, China was on Pakistan's side.”

Visão looks ahead to Wednesday's military parade, at which China will commemorate the 80th anniversary of the victory over Japan and which Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un are expected to attend:

“Xi is the wolf in sheep's clothing. He smiles and waves, but he's the new emperor. Putin remains the fickle Cossack - clever, calculating, but with increasingly empty pockets. Kim is the dangerous braggart, propped up by Beijing. Three men, three Stalinists. Or rather, three redux versions of Stalin. ... Xi will not be parading to honour anyone, he'll be flexing his muscles. To spread fear. Among the guests, in Washington, at Nato.”

Jutarnji list sums up:

“With the guests who have travelled to the summit and through diplomatic finesse and PR tactics, the Chinese regime wants to send three messages. Firstly, that the challengers to the world order dominated for decades by the West are united in stable agreement, with a relationship based on trust and dialogue - in contrast to the aggressive and unilateral dominance of the West over 'smaller' and 'weaker' countries. Secondly, the presence of Putin and Kim Jong-un [at Wednesday's military parade in Beijing] symbolises the deep political and military cohesion between China, Russia and North Korea: a defence bloc with joint forces that unreservedly opposes Nato's dominance. And thirdly, Xi wants to present (a strong) China as the leading stabilising force in a fragmented and turbulent world.”