Drone incident: how should the EU respond?

In addition to showing unity, EU member states must adopt concrete measures against the Russian aggressor, Libération argues:

“Putin's aim is to sow doubt, to divide Europeans, to strengthen the far right wherever it stands a chance of making a breakthrough (for example this coming weekend in Saxony-Anhalt), to stoke paranoia – in short, to play with fire. Until it all blows up? That very question is part of the threat. And it is what makes a response so complicated. ... This is what is currently paralysing the Europeans, whose foreign ministers met in Dublin on Wednesday. They all agreed on condemning Russia, which is a start. But they haven't yet found the right way to tackle the problem.”

Germany cannot deter Putin from further aggression on its own, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung writes:

“This can only be achieved by acting in close unison with our partners and allies in the EU and Nato. But the fact that the EU is now negotiating its 22nd sanctions package is more a sign of weakness than of strength. When it comes to sanctions against Russia, EU member states often struggle more among themselves than with Russia. EU member states are still buying oil and gas from Putin, the frozen Russian state assets are still not being made available to Ukraine, and Germany still hasn't given up the Russian pollack that goes into its beloved fish fingers. Yet only a united Europe that is prepared to make financial sacrifices can hope to make Putin stop and think.”

Germany must become a regional hegemonic power within a Greater Europe, writes political scientist Carlos Gaspar in Público:

“The break between Russia and Germany, the growing distance between the US and Western Europe, and the escalation of the war in Ukraine and the Middle East have created the conditions for Germany to become a regional hegemonic power. ... Germany's strategy follows the American model of regional integration, which combines the deepening of relations between European states with the expansion of Europe's borders. The construction of a European defence union is inextricably linked to Ukraine's accession to the European institutions, with the aim of creating a free and united 'Greater Europe'.”

Gazeta Wyborcza stresses that this is not the time for German-Polish historical debates:

“It is regrettable that a section of the Polish political class still fails to recognise the gravity of the situation and makes anti-German statements, as if we were still living in 2019. President Karol Nawrocki's tirades on 1 September during the commemorative ceremonies at Westerplatte concerning the Weimar Republic's anti-Polish policies, the revival of the reparations issue and the stoking of anti-German phobias have nothing to do with honouring the Polish victims of the Third Reich. ... Today, the dividing line in Europe – a potential front line – runs not between Poland and Germany, but along the border with Russia.”

Eitvydas Bajarūnas, former Lithuanian ambassador to Russia, sees the real news value in Berlin's reaction. He writes in LRT:

“For a long time Berlin was very cautious – not only when it came to identifying Russian hybrid operations but in particular when considering countermeasures. Now we're seeing a changing Germany – one that is not only deploying a brigade in Lithuania and strengthening the Bundeswehr, its air defences and security forces in the Baltic Sea, but may also be more inclined to make Russia pay a concrete political and economical price for its hybrid operations. ... It is nothing new that Russia is waging a hybrid war. What is new is that Germany is finally beginning to respond to it differently.”

The dynamics of war must be decelerated, Le Figaro urges:

“For the time being, it is the war that is gaining ground, with Moscow stepping up its hybrid attacks on Ukraine's Western allies. ... And on the Ukrainian side, the threat to 'block' Russian airspace for civilian air traffic also has the potential to lead to an escalation. In a conflict that has exhausted virtually all options, these stopgap measures will not be enough to break a nation's morale. The danger of the conflict spreading is growing. A ceasefire, as proposed by Volodymyr Zelensky, is therefore urgently needed to halt this headlong rush.”

A response to the Russian attacks was long overdue, says Frankfurter Rundschau:

“It also sends a signal to EU citizens to take the Russian threat more seriously and not just see it as a distant war against Ukraine. Sanctions alone are not enough. Germany and its partners will have to do more than before to mitigate the consequences of Russia's hybrid war, which encompasses sabotage and disinformation campaigns. ... The EU should go a step further. Spain and Greece should hand over their Patriot missile defence ammunition to Ukraine so that the invaded country can better protect itself against Russian attacks.”

The Tages-Anzeiger praises the response:

“This is a moderate signal to Putin, a cautious one even, since Berlin has refrained from involving Nato. Yet it is also a measured response because Chancellor Friedrich Merz thus retains the option to resort to the means of escalation: firstly, Article 4, which provides for consultations within the defence alliance if 'the territorial integrity or security' of an ally is threatened. And if the Russian bully still does not cease his provocations, Nato could then activate Article 5, the collective defence clause – at which point war in Europe would not be far off. Rationally speaking, Putin can have no interest in things going that far. But this warlord has not been behaving particularly rationally for some time now.”

Unfortunately, the time for purely diplomatic responses is over, De Standaard stresses:

“Germany and its Nato allies must now do everything in their power to break free from the logic that military action is the only possible next move. Perhaps the concept of 'hybrid defence and deterrence' can buy some time, with a combination of diplomatic and economic sanctions and the accelerated expansion of their own defence capabilities. But the little diplomacy that had tentatively been pursued so far will be destroyed as a result. Positions will inevitably harden. There is no longer any buffer to prevent a reaction.”

Journalist Sergei Aslanjan makes light of Germany's reaction on Facebook:

“Russia has acted treacherously, even though it knows that the Bundeswehr is not online at night and only wages war during working hours, in daylight from 8 am to 5 pm and with a lunch break. Russia's military operations on German territory disrupt the Chancellor's schedule, throw his staff's work into disarray and prevent a well-considered response, thereby provoking the government into taking hasty measures. This has a significant impact on Germany's defence capabilities, deprives Bundeswehr soldiers of their statutory benefits, disrupts their workflow and hinders their combat training.”

Russia is pursuing a grand plan with small-scale actions, writes military expert Alexandru Grumaz in Adevărul:

“Moscow is targeting the system that is helping Ukraine to continue its fight. ... This is the fundamental problem for Nato. A large-scale attack on a member state is relatively easy to assess, both politically and militarily. A drone found near an airport, a suspicious fire in a factory, a damaged cable, a CCTV camera that has been tampered with or a saboteur recruited via Telegram are far more difficult to deal with. Taken individually, these incidents may be too minor to warrant a major response. Taken together, however, they can add up to a campaign. That is the essence of hybrid warfare.”