Iran war: can Washington and Tehran reach a deal?
The US government has reportedly delivered a 15-point plan to the Iranian regime to end the war. Iran has rejected the proposals, which called among other things for a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and denies that any negotiations are underway. Claiming that 'very good' talks being conducted, Donald Trump has pushed back his already extended ultimatum – this time until 6 April.
It all hangs on the right people
Much now hangs on whether the right negotiation partners can be found in Tehran, Phileleftheros observes:
“The key lies in the sentence that Trump keeps repeating: 'We are talking with the right people.' This sentence is as important for what it doesn't say as for what it does say. It suggests that Washington is not talking to official regime hardliners, but to people who could function as bridges between various centres of power in Tehran. So the key question is not whether a negotiation channel exists, but rather who it consists of and whether these people have the power to push an agreement through the current Iranian system.”
Tehran playing cat and mouse with Trump
Psychologically speaking, Iran is emerging as the victor in this war, Der Standard comments:
“The war is unpopular in the US, the rising fuel prices even more so; the Republicans are getting nervous and the Democrats are in open revolt. Trump's often confused statements and his alternating between peace offerings and threats stand in marked contrast to the Iranian regime, which is playing a diplomatic game of cat and mouse with Washington and seems to know exactly what it wants: to put its arch-enemies the US and Israel in their place, at least psychologically. What North Vietnam and the Taliban once achieved is now in sight for Iran.”
Paying the price for haphazard attacks
Iran has greater leverage, die Welt fears:
“It is not Washington but Tehran that can escalate without fear of major consequences – attacking tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, or the desalination plants of its Arab neighbours – or razing their refineries to the ground. The US might be fantasising about occupying Iran's oil hub Kharg Island. But what that would achieve, no one knows. It is now becoming clear that Donald Trump's failure to devise a strategy for this war is coming back to haunt him. ... Things are not looking good for the Americans, and by extension for the West as a whole.”
Kharg Island as a potential bargaining chip
Dzerkalo Tyzhnia doesn't rule out a limited ground operation:
“This is very unlikely to involve an attempt to get the coast of the Strait of Hormuz under control. That would be a complex and costly operation which would burn through resources and time and would still be unable to guarantee the security of oil tankers passing through. ... The White House is far more likely to focus on Kharg Island, which is the terminal for nearly all of the Islamic Republic's oil exports. From a purely military point of view, this task would be significantly easier. If that were indeed the case, Washington would presumably hope to force Tehran into an agreement from a position of strength.”
US in a dilemma
Washington is in a difficult position, comments Diário de Notícias:
“Iran, aware of its asymmetric advantage, is demanding substantial compensation, guarantees that it will not be attacked, and permission to continue its 'civilian' nuclear programme. For Washington, accepting these conditions would be politically toxic and strategically risky. Rejecting them, however, could push the conflict to a point of no return. The problem for Washington is that, as long as the stalemate persists, Iran will continue to operate on the only playing field it truly masters: that of calculated unpredictability. And for now, it is this that is shaping the future of the region and the global economy.”
Dealmaker up against his limits
The door has slammed shut in Trump's face, according to La Stampa:
“We are all familiar with the Trump negotiation approach by now: a broad, ambitious programme that aims to freeze the conflict while dictating conditions that often have very little to do with the reality on the ground. And this time it could fail. For two reasons. Firstly, Tehran has learned that any glimmer of hope for negotiations can be dashed by an Israeli military initiative, often backed by Washington. Secondly, the context has changed, and the 15 points issued by the White House, a reworking of those presented for the negotiations at the end of May, do not seem to take account of the increased influence of the parties involved. ... And Tehran is slamming the door shut. ”
Trump could be preparing to withdraw
Club Z suspects this could turn out to be the beginning of the end of the conflict:
“The most likely scenario at present is that the attacks will come to an end by 14 April, the US and Iran will both declare victory, but in reality none of the issues that sparked the war will have been resolved, and in effect everything will quickly return to the status quo that existed before the attacks. That would come as no surprise. Over the past twelve months Trump has taken such steps on several occasions, launching what appears to be a major operation only to halt it midway, declare it over and withdraw without anything actually having been achieved.”
Fear of sabotage by Israel
Columnist Abdülkadir Selvi examines Israel's role in Hürriyet:
“Can the US and Iran reach an agreement? Yes, they can. But there is a very serious obstacle standing in the way of peace. And that is Israel. Whichever side I speak to, they begin by saying: 'But only if Israel doesn't sabotage it…' And they conclude with: 'We are hopeful. But only if Israel doesn't sabotage the process…' In the past, the US set limits for Israel. Now Israel is setting limits for the US. That must be Trump's 'Great America!' … America wants to reach a deal with Iran, but fears that Israel might sabotage it.”
Pseudo-negotiations a recipe for disaster
In a Facebook post picked up by Echo, journalist Yevgeny Feldman comments on reports suggesting that the US only went through the motions of negotiating in the run up to the war with Iran:
“When sensitive and complex negotiations are conducted in bad faith – not with the intention of reaching an agreement, but simply to distract and reassure the opponent into order to pave the way for a more effective first strike – this undermines future negotiations. And not only in the context of this war! It will become more difficult in the future to stop nuclear programmes of regimes of terror, to free political prisoners and to end wars. Nations around the world must constantly engage in negotiations. If this becomes impossible, it poses a threat to civilisation.”