Protests in Iran: regime change on the cards?

So far all the protest movements in Iran have ended in a wave of repression, but this time could be different, writes Observador:

“Unlike during previous protests, which were generally triggered by economic and financial crises, of which there are plenty in a country impoverished by the Shiite revolution, Iran is now in a more precarious position. Its empire of Shiite oppression has collapsed like dominoes. The decapitation of Hezbollah and Hamas by Israeli forces, the fall of Bashar Assad in Syria, the unpunished attacks by Israel and the US on the Islamic Republic's air defences and its nuclear programme – in the Middle East, the geopolitical situation tends to determine the fate of regimes and domestic politics.”

The protests are not pursuing a common line and their outcome remains open, observes columnist Pierre Haski on France Inter:

“Iranians are divided between those who, given all the setbacks and bloodshed, hope for outside intervention, and those who are vehemently opposed to it and believe it plays into the regime's hands – it's the very picture of a fragmented opposition. But there is also the recognition that Trump did not act in Venezuela in the name of democracy, but instead left the decapitated regime in power, disappointing those who had hoped for more. For all these reasons, the outcome of the Iranian protests remains uncertain. The only indisputable element is the courage of this people, who tirelessly seek to tear down the walls that imprison them – until one day these walls finally come down.”

An overthrow of the regime in Tehran would carry major risks for the civilian population, writes Público:

“Recent history in the Middle East shows how the sudden collapse of authoritarian regimes can lead to chaos, sectarian violence and prolonged civil wars – a scenario many Iranians fear just as much as they loathe their rulers. … The most pragmatic course – and perhaps the only viable one – is for Tehran to recognise that a change of direction is needed. Resuming serious negotiations over the nuclear programme, seeking an easing of sanctions, and creating economic and social breathing space to meet the population’s demands are not signs of capitulation, but of survival.”

Without support from other countries the uprising is doomed to fail, explains military expert Sergei Auslender in a Telegram post reposted by Echo:

“The protests have no organisation to lead them, no weapons and no share in power. The regime has shown itself to be relatively stable so far: its apparatus is well developed, armed and brutal. Ten armed and reasonably well trained people can take on a hundred, a hundred can take on ten thousand – and so on. If there is no external impetus (and Trump has promised help), the protests will soon fizzle out. When people are constantly being killed or injured around you and there is no prospect of victory, despair sets in, turns into apathy – and people go home.”

The Iranian regime has its back against the wall, writes Der Standard:

“This time there is danger on two fronts, from inside and outside the country: demonstrators, some of them ready to resort to violence, are chanting 'Down with the dictator!', and threats from the US and Israel which no longer sound unrealistic after the 12-day war in June 2025. ... US Secretary of State Marco Rubio never tires of spreading the message, including on the US State Department's Persian-language X account, that everyone knows by now that Donald Trump means what he says. According to Rubio, the US president wants to 'come to the aid' of the demonstrators if the regime uses violence against them.”

Iranians must take fate into their own hands, urges sociologist Azadeh Kian in Le Monde:

“Trump's threats of military intervention, which were renewed following the kidnapping of Maduro, as well as the declarations of solidarity with the people of Iran by Mossad and Benjamin Netanyahu, ultimately only benefit the Islamic regime: it can accuse all opposition figures of being agents of the US and Israel. ... It's up to the Iranian people to bring about regime change. And it is only the convergence of the struggles for freedom of the different social, ethnic and religious groups that can free Iran from the stranglehold of the regime.”

This won't work, says El País:

“Some commentators are cheering on the protesters as if they were watching a football match. ... The new wave of protests is fuelling expectations among those who long for the collapse of the Islamic Republic. But we shouldn't place an unreasonable burden on the Iranian people. ... Without a clear leadership, a well-organised movement or a strategy that challenges the real power base - not the old ayatollahs, but the generals of the Revolutionary Guard - the protests will only further weaken Massoud Pesezhkian's government, which is already constrained by the system's architecture and unable to implement the promised reforms. Meanwhile, the hardliners will be strengthened.”

In a guest commentary in L'Obs, Iranian political scientist Hamid Enayat points to clear differences vis-à-vis past protests:

“Unlike previous uprisings, this one is far more structured. Resistance groups have managed to maintain the momentum of the movement across very different milieus - from bazaars and universities to provincial towns. Furthermore, unlike in the past, French politicians and states publicly condemned the regime's repression from the day after the revolt began. International pressure is undeniably limiting its repression capacity.”

Europe would also benefit from the regime's downfall, Svenska Dagbladet notes:

“The theocratic regime also poses a threat to us. Our freedom of expression, and above all our freedom to criticise Islam, has not been the same ever since the fatwa issued against author Salman Rushdie in 1989. And more recently, Iran has ordered attacks by gang leaders against Iranian exiles and Israeli targets in Sweden. This is just one of many examples of how Iran is playing a leading role in the increasingly globalised cooperation between dictatorships that seek to protect authoritarian rulers from their own own people. Democracies therefore have a vested interest in supporting people's quest for freedom, also in Iran.”

Strikes in the bazaars put the regime under serious pressure, writes the taz:

“Because in the past this has been a warning signal: from the tobacco movement in 1891 to the revolution in 1979, bazaars have always been a catalyst for political upheaval. The regime attempted to protect itself from this and secure loyalty in the bazaars by awarding licences and official posts. With a few exceptions, the bazaars have since been regarded as a conservative pillar of the system. And they remained silent while others protested. These strikes now cast doubt on the legitimacy of that system.”

Polityka dampens any hopes of a regime change:

“The current unrest is not on the same scale as the protests in 2009 or those that followed. ... No leaders can be identified. And ultimately, the third element of a revolution is missing: at least up to now, there are no visible 'cracks' in the regime. ... In previous centuries, uprisings in the bazaars frequently determined the future of Iran, formerly Persia. However, this was only the case when these uprisings were followed by revolts in large companies and factories, particularly in the oil sector, which is crucial to the regime's financial stability – and there is currently no sign of this.”

Phileleftheros describes the background to the protests:

“A proud people with a long history in a country with vast natural resources and other riches are living in poverty and with almost no water under a regime that spends vast sums on nuclear programmes, ballistic missiles and financing terrorist organisations. ... Recently, Iranians learned that Tehran – home to ten million people, or fifteen million if you include the suburbs – may have to 'move' because the state is unable to supply it with water. All the attention and resources have been focused on other things: weapons and rhetoric about the destruction of Israel.”