US extends ceasefire: does Iran have the upper hand?

Merely pointing to a divide in Iran between pragmatists and hardliners is too simplistic, argues the Aargauer Zeitung:

“What is underway in Iran is a systemic transformation that is far from complete. For more than four decades the Islamic Republic functioned as a hybrid system, led by a cleric – most recently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, for more than 37 years – who acted as a kind of hinge between the various power blocs: the clergy, the military, technocrats and ideologues. ... According to most Iran experts, in the power vacuum that has emerged following Khamenei's death the Revolutionary Guards have effectively taken control of the country; not through a coup but through the 'creeping logic of war': those who fight give the orders. Those who give the orders decide.”

Sociologist Igor Eidman offers a psychological explanation on Facebook as to why Iran is refusing to yield to the US:

“Today, Iran refused to hold talks with the US just as Donald Trump had extended the ceasefire with Iran without receiving anything in return. Nor did he receive anything when he forced Israel to halt its operations against Hezbollah. Why is Iran taking such a hard line? Because Trump is displaying weakness and insecurity, is torn between conflicting positions and reacts hysterically, doesn't keep his word and doesn't understand the importance of 'saving face'. Such people are not respected or taken seriously in the Middle East – or anywhere else.”

The Süddeutsche Zeitung points to a fundamental imbalance between the warring parties:

“While Donald Trump is under pressure because of the midterm elections in November and growing criticism from within his own ranks, the leadership in Tehran doesn't care what its people think. ... They lost the support of the population long ago. So if they refuse to negotiate and bombs start falling again, killing civilians, it makes no difference to them. And if they do negotiate and actually reach an agreement with the US, that would be the worst possible outcome for the Iranian people anyway. For it would mean that the Revolutionary Guard retains power for decades to come. Whatever the Guards do: they are protecting the regime, not the people.”

Daily Sabah currently sees little prospect of a deal:

“The most striking feature of the cease-fire is that it allows both sides to claim victory at the same time. These parallel narratives do not create room for compromise. They eliminate it. Each leadership is now locked into a domestic political framework in which any concession would be interpreted as defeat. ... For Tehran, this period is not a pause but a preparation phase. Missile stockpiles are being replenished, air defenses reinforced, and contingency plans updated. If negotiations fail, the next phase of the war will likely unfold under harsher conditions.”

Middle East expert Ihor Semyvolos comments in a Facebook post:

“One can concur with a host of experts who say that the US is currently 'in a worse position' than before the war began. Before the war the US and Israel could threaten with escalation as a means of exerting pressure. But now that escalation has happened – and Iran has survived, closed the strait and gained new means of influence. The threat 'we will strike again' now seems less convincing since the first strike failed to achieve its stated objectives. ... Iran understands this – hence its new willingness to engage in talks, accompanied by a readiness to escalate.”

Svenska Dagbladet speculates about Trump's motives for extending the ceasefire:

“The war itself is unpopular and is also driving up the price of petrol for American voters, for whom the high cost of living in the US is already a major factor. But the White House could have weighed up which method – air strikes or diplomacy – was most likely to produce a peace agreement or something that could be quickly chalked up as an American victory. ... There are now only 28 weeks left until the midterms, in which most people assume that the Republicans will lose their majority in the House of Representatives.”

The Financial Times sees a pattern:

“Escalation is likely because both the US and Iran seem to feel that they can force the other side to crack first. ... Throughout this conflict, the Trump administration has consistently overestimated America's ability to bend Iran to its will and underestimated the Iranian regime's resilience. That pattern now threatens to repeat itself. ... The coming weeks, and perhaps months, are likely to see periods of escalation, mixed with periods of talks – with the two processes sometimes running side by side – as Iran and the US test each other's will.”

Pakistan is cutting an impressive figure as a mediator in the conflict between Iran and the US, writes Tages-Anzeiger:

“The country, itself a nuclear power, is currently proving that multilateralism works even – or perhaps especially – in a world of bullies. Pakistan's government and its all-powerful military have quietly and patiently exchanged messages between the warring parties time and again, discussing terms and feeling out red lines. By acting as a central mediator, it has gained diplomatic stature: this is a new experience for a country that has otherwise had a hard time. Pakistan.”

Trump hasn't achieved much yet, Die Zeit comments.

“Ultimately the deal that they end up with could be a lot more favourable for the Iranians than the agreement signed under Obama. The deal from which Trump was so insistent on withdrawing. Of course he is determined that this will not be how things are interpreted. He has made plenty of statements recently about how much his approach and the potential outcome differs from that of his predecessor. But there's still no way of knowing what will emerge from the negotiations. If the last few hours are anything to go by, there is no indication that Trump will be able to negotiate a better deal.”

Iran is unlikely to abandon its nuclear programme, fears Ilta-Sanomat:

“None of the parties has anything to gain from this war continuing. ... Iran's infrastructure has already suffered so much damage that reconstruction will take years. ... If Trump got his hands on the uranium, he could claim to have won an easy victory. In return, the Iranians would secure both peace and the lifting of sanctions. But the Iranians seem to have become obsessed with their nuclear programme, although it has brought them nothing but destruction. If the world acted rationally, we would already have peace. But the world does not act rationally.”

The two-week ceasefire has not brought peace any closer, laments La Stampa:

“This is not a period of transition from war to peace; the ceasefire is not ushering in peace, it is pushing it further away. ... The issue here is not that the ceasefire is coming to an end, but that it has already been undermined. Talks are going on while ships are being stormed, while more bombardments are being threatened and while the Strait of Hormuz is being blocked. Diplomacy is not replacing military pressure but accompanying it. What good are negotiations if the situation itself remains non-negotiable?”

The Tages-Anzeiger explains what makes Iran's powerful Revolutionary Guard tick:

“The Guard is a bit like a sect, and its soldiers consider themselves the chosen ones, the ones with a mandate to protect the regime. Not Iran, the country, but the Islamic Republic. Which is why they barely bat an eyelid when the White House threatens to destroy the country's infrastructure. The current war is the emergency for which they have been preparing for decades. It is not one issue among many, as it is for Donald Trump. For someone like Ahmad Vahidi, the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, this is an historic moment, the moment when the system is facing it greatest challenge.”

The Kurier eyes the divisions within the Iranian regime:

“Iran is on its last legs before its economy finally collapses. ... But very few political leaders in Tehran seem to acknowledge this, and the Revolutionary Guards are unwilling to budge even an inch. So we can already see a clear rift in Iran's power structures between those who want to lead the country out of the war by making significant, though still hard-won, concessions to the US and those who, with the blind fury of religious fanaticism, would rather see the theocracy destroyed than yield. Which of the various factions prevails in Tehran will be crucial in the coming weeks and months.”

Political scientist Vladimir Pastukhov comments in a Telegram post picked up by Echo:

“It all hangs on whether a defector can be found in the top ranks of the Revolutionary Guards who will switch sides to support 'civilian administration' (where, as in any despotic regime, there are plenty of collaborators) and thereby create the conditions for Iran's peaceful surrender. If that happens, fortune will shine on Trump – and on all of us. The conflict would reach a sort of 'half-solution', and we will be able to live for a little longer within the familiar paradigms of a crumbling but, in its own way, likeable world order (compared, that is, to what lies ahead).”

Commentator Lluís Bassets sees little cause for optimism in El País:

“Fragile, temporary and even contradictory truces, instead of a general ceasefire followed by the peace that the region deserves. ... It will take a miracle for such a truce to hold. ... Unless the guns between Israel and Hezbollah truly fall silent, how can there be progress in the peace talks between Iran and the US?. ... How can hasty negotiations solve disputes that no one has been able to resolve since 1979 in the case of Iran, and since 1948 in Lebanon's case? ... Trump's vainglorious euphoria is not providing even the faintest glimmer of hope for a peaceful and amicable solution to such thorny issues.”

Despite sanctions and surveillance, Iran has managed to secretly build up its military arsenal, Diário de Notícias concludes:

“The smoke hanging over Iran's cities and industrial complexes should dispel one of the greatest illusions of modern geopolitics: that economic sanctions and IAEA monitoring have been effective in curbing Tehran's military ambitions. Reality has proven the opposite. While the world was focusing on the technical debate over small quantities of enriched uranium and the fate of the nuclear deal, the Iranian regime was carrying out a quiet but profound military transformation, the results of which are now visible to all.”

The relief at the opening of the Strait of Hormuz didn't even last 24 hours, complains Novinky.cz:

“The morning's optimism gave way to brutal reality when two ships – a tanker and a container ship – were rammed. The only good thing to come out of all this is that the price of oil, which had fallen on Friday after the announcement about opening the strait, didn't immediately shoot up again, because oil can't be traded at the weekend. ... It should be a lesson for us all: dealings with Iran will never be easy. To think otherwise would be naive. And even if they were, it's always better to be positively surprised than to be confronted with a situation for which you are not prepared. Of course, that still doesn't answer the question of whether to fill up the tank now or to wait another week.”