Mobilisation rumours: Kremlin under pressure?
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has stalled on the ground – and the war is taking an ever bigger toll on the Russian economy. Meanwhile, Kyiv claims to have recaptured 745 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory since the start of the year. Against this backdrop, talk of a new mobilisation is growing louder in Moscow – although this is unlikely to happen before the Duma elections in mid-September. What would the impact be?
Risky move
A large-scale mobilisation would be Putin's second big mistake after the invasion of Ukraine, Handelsblatt comments:
“The already negative mood in Russia could turn into open outrage. Putin's approval ratings are likely to drop – just as they did after the first mobilisation in September 2022. Back then, there were public protests, and tens of thousands of Russians fled abroad. The stagnating economy would be deprived of even more workers. On top of that, it's doubtful whether the plan would succeed. Ukraine has neutralised the Russians' numerical superiority with its drones. If Putin now sends twice as many soldiers to charge against the Ukrainian drone wall, twice as many will die.”
Acid test for Russians and regime
Journalist and soldier Pavlo Kazarin comments on Slawa.tv:
“Mobilisation in itself will not lead to political protest or political action in Russia. However, it may place additional strain on the administrative system, as it would mean finding recruits, conscripting them, issuing them with uniforms, transporting them to their posts, arming them, training them and finding commanders for them. It will also place additional burdens on society, which opinion polls tell us is weary in this fifth year of the war and must now watch as Ukrainian drones bring the war back to Russian territory.”
Not the right moment
Political scientist Abbas Gallyamov offers the Kremlin advice on mobilisation in a Facebook post:
“As with any other unpopular measure, mobilisation – whether covert or overt – must be carried out from a position of strength, not from a position of weakness. The Kremlin should not link mobilisation to elections – which, strictly speaking, don't even exist as an event – but to some sort of breakthrough on the front line. People should be called up when they see the prospect of a swift victory. Then everything will go more smoothly. ... But as long as the government has nothing to show for its efforts, it's better not to place an unnecessary burden on the population.”
Triumphant mood has evaporated
A year ago tomorrow, Putin met with Trump in Alaska. In Ukrainska Pravda, former diplomat Lana Serkal describes how the political climate in Russia has changed since then:
“Within a year, the 'spirit of Anchorage' has lost its imperialist undertones. Instead, the all too familiar stench of resentment has returned. ... Russian newspapers are full of headlines claiming that 'the West dreams of Russia's collapse'. ... Together with the accusations levelled at Ukraine regarding a 'sharp escalation', this can be interpreted as an attempt to prepare public opinion in Russia – both for a possible mobilisation and for the search for scapegoats to blame for the fact that the war has now arrived on Russia's doorstep.”
North Koreans buying time for Putin
At this point the Kremlin is still trying to avoid a mobilisation, Rzeczpospolita notes:
“Putin is once again in dire need of Kim's support, not least to avoid a further mobilisation. According to Ukrainian sources, Pyongyang has sent more troops to Russia – this time between 30,000 and 50,000 – along with a ballistic missile unit comprising nine launchers and 100 to 120 missiles. On 30 July, Kyiv reported that the first two North Korean missiles had struck Ukrainian cities. If this is true, the Kremlin will have a brief respite from deploying its own missiles, allowing it to build up reserves and prepare for truly large-scale missile strikes.”
Undermine the system
Contact with members of the Russian elite must be re-established, Corriere della Sera advises:
“Cracks are now becoming perceptible in Moscow. ... German Gref, CEO of Russia's largest bank, has even gone so far as to say in public that all Russians should want peace and that the country's economy cannot carry on like this. For Europeans, the time has come to seek out covert contacts with those elites close to Putin who are compromised but potentially disloyal. ... Merely imposing sanctions on all of Putin's men may satisfy our sense of justice, but it leaves the oligarchs confined to their own country and forces them to rally around the Kremlin. ... Instead, we must pull the rug out from under Putin's feet and undermine loyalties within his system.”